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INTRODUCTION
A review of international data indicates that nearly without exception, women are
economically disadvantaged as compared to their male counterparts.' Women make up
70% of the World's 1.3 billion poor.2 Globally, while women contribute 66% of the
hours worked each day, they earn only 10% of the World's income. 3 In the United
States, approximately 26% of all female-headed families live in poverty, while only
approximately 5% of families in which males are present live under such conditions.4
In Brazil, women working in manufacturing jobs earn 61% relative to that of men 3 In
Mexico, women working in manufacturing jobs earn 70% relative to that of men.6
Meanwhile, in an attempt to facilitate the transition into what some term a "global
economy," many countries have collaborated to assemble international trade and
'Copyright 2003 Hannah L. Meils. All rights reserved.
* J.D. Candidate, 2003, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.A., 1998,
Indiana University. I would like to thank Ryan Otten for his support and sense of humor
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1. Edna Acosta-Beldn & Christine E. Bose, Colonialism, Structural Subordination, and
Empowerment, in WOMEN IN THE LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT PROCESs 20 (Christine E.
Bose & Edna Acosta-Bel6n eds., 1995).
2. U.N. Report on Women (1975).
3. Acosta-Bel6n & Bose, supra note I, at 20.
4. Institute for Research on Poverty, Frequently Asked Questions, at
http://www.ssc.wisc.edu/irp/faqs/faq3.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2003).
5. United Nations Statistics Division, The Worlds Women 2000: Trends and Statistics, at
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/ww2000/table5g.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2003).
6. Id.
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investment agreements. These international trade agreements have the potential to
serve as tools to remedy some of the economic inequities women face by setting forth
specific labor protections. The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
("NAALC"), 7 a side agreement passed along with the North American Free Trade
Agreement ("NAFTA"), 8 included provisions for the protection of the member
countries' laborers. The provisions of the NAALC did not, however, include
protections strong enough to counter specific problems faced by women.
Presently, all countries of the Western Hemisphere are negotiating a trade
agreement termed the Free Trade Area of the Americas ("FrAA"). This agreement
offers a unique opportunity to rectify the weaknesses contained in the NAFTA and
NAALC agreements and to strengthen the protections available for women laborers.
Some have argued that labor provisions have no place within international trade
agreements because the implementation of trade agreements among countries has a
"trickle down effect," meaning that as the governments, corporations, and investors
become wealthier within a given country, the average person within the country will
benefit as well.9 As will be seen, however, the "trickle down" theory has not proven
accurate in reality.
This Note will discuss the ways in which NAFTA has failed to offer women
laborers sufficient protections and will outline the ways in which future trade
agreements, including the FTAA, can offer strengthened protections for women. This
Note will first counter the argument made by those who believe that labor concerns
have no place within international trade agreements. It will then address the problems
that women have faced in getting their specific labor needs addressed. Then, the Note
will outline the substantive and procedural provisions contained within the NAFTA
and NAALC agreements and point to specific areas where women's labor needs were
underaddressed, or simply not addressed at all. Finally, this Note will outline several
ways in which the lessons from NAFTA will allow the creation of a strong, women's-
labor-friendly international trade agreement with the FTAA, if only negotiators will
heed the failings of the NAFTA and NAALC agreements.
I. OVERVIEW
In an attempt to facilitate the transition into what some term a "global economy,"
many countries have collaborated to assemble international trade and investment
agreements. In 1992, the Prime Minister of Canada and the Presidents of the United
States and Mexico signed such a multilateral trade agreement called the North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA").' 0 NAFTA went into effect on January 1,
1994. "
7. Agreement on Labor Cooperation, Sept. 13, 1993, U.S.-Mex.-Can., 32 I.L.M. 1499
[hereinafter NAALC].
8. Agreement on Free Trade, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Mex.-Can., 32 I.L.M. 289 [hereinafter
NAFTA].
9. Marjorie Cohn, The World Trade Organization: Elevating Property Interests Above
Human Rights, 29 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 427, 428 (2001).
10. John M. Broder, U.S., Mexico, Canada Heads Sign Trade Pact Accord: Support Is
Widespread in Mexico, Mixed in Canada, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1992, at D1.
11. Betty Southard Murphy, NAFTA 's North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation:
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Supporters of multilateral trade agreements argue that their implementation will
have a "trickle down effect," meaning that as the governments, corporations, and
investors become wealthier within a given country, the average person within the
country will benefit as well.12 Government negotiators have used this rationalization to
avoid and deflect requests by marginalized groups, such as labor and women's
organizations, to have a voice in the negotiations of these global trade agreements.13
The multilateral trade agreements, it has been argued, have no negative impact upon
these marginalized groups, and, as a consequence, these groups have no business at the
negotiating table. 14
As will be discussed, however, this "trickle down" theory has not proven accurate in
reality. 15 Since the passage of NAFTA, there has been an increased stratification
between those with the most wealth and those witl the least. 16 Additionally, trade
agreements significantly impact labor, and women's labor in particular.17 Conversely,
women's labor significantly affects trade. 18 Yet, despite these realities, labor
organizations and women's organizations have consistently been denied a seat at the
negotiating table for international trade agreements. 19 The view that labor does not fall
within the scope of international trade has rendered inadequate the minimal protections
that have been provided within international trade agreements, such as NAFT7A, for
labor generally and women's labor in particular.
Nevertheless, NAFTA and the side agreement regarding labor negotiated along with
NAFTA, called the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation ("NAALC"),
were termed a success by member governments. Immediately after its passage, the
NAFTA member governments began discussions to expand a NAFTA-like agreement
to all of the countries contained within the Western Hemisphere. 21 While an expansion
of the NAFTA agreement itself proved unworkable, in 1994, thirty-four countries
within the Western Hemisphere met at a meeting called the Summit of the Americas
and announced their goal to create a hemispheric free trade zone.22 This trade zone is
to be called the Free Trade Area of the Americas ("FTAA"). 2' The FTAA constitutes
The Present and the Future, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 403, 403 (1995) (stating background
information regarding the NAFTA).
12. See Cohn, supra note 9, at 428 (explaining why multilateral trade agreements do not, in
fact, give rise to such a "trickle down effect").
13. See Nicole L. Grimm, Comment, The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
and Its Effects on Women Working in Mexican Maquiladoras, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 179, 185
(1998).
14. Chantell Taylor, NAFTA, GATT, and the Current Free Trade System: A Dangerous
Double Standard for Workers' Rights, 28 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 401, 411-12 (2000).
15. Id.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 47-48.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 68-73.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 68-73.
19. Grimm, supra note 13, at 185.
20. Id. at 180.
21. Jonathan S. Blum, Comment, The FTAA and the Fast Track to Forgetting the
Environment: A Comparison of the NAFTA and the MERCOSUR Environmental Models as
Examples for the Hemisphere, 35 TEX. INT'L L.J. 435, 437-38 (2000).
22. Id. at 435-36.
23. Id.
2003]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
an effort by all of the western hemispheric governments.(excluding Cuba) to eliminate
"barriers to trade and investment." 24 The objective of the FTAA is to remove
restrictions on the free movement of "capital, goods, and services" between countries
in the Western Hemisphere. 25 The FTAA is projected by its negotiators to be
completed by the year 2005.26
However, the same difficulties that plagued NAFTA present similar problems for
the FTAA.27 Thus far, drafts of the FTAA have failed to include provisions to protect
28labor concerns. Labor and human rights groups have become vocal opponents of the
FTAA.29 These groups believe that the FTAA will "empower corporations to constrain
governments [sic] ability to set standards for public health and safety, to safeguard the
rights of their workers, and to ensure that corporations do not pollute the communities
in which they operate."30 Despite these concerns, labor representatives have been
excluded from the FTAA negotiations.3' Organizations concerning labor and human
rights requested a working group that could influence FTAA negotiations; however,
these requests were denied.32 Opponents of the FTAA fear that this lack of
representation by labor and human rights groups will result in a hemispheric trade
agreement lacking a conscience.33
The FTAA presents a unique opportunity to account for NAFTA's failures and to
rectify them. While NAFTA was historic in that it was the first international trade
agreement in which the United States participated that included provisions for labor, it
has not been fully effective in securing labor rights within the member nations.34
Significantly, many of women's unique labor needs were ignored altogether.
35
Recognizing where the NAFTA agreement failed women laborers will allow women to
more effectively lobby governments to address their concerns with the FTAA. The
FTAA could serve as an effective tool in protecting the labor needs of women, if only
negotiators will heed the lessons learned from past mistakes.
II. ROLE OF LABOR ISSUES IN TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
Supporters of trade agreements such as NAFTA have argued that opponents of
liberalized trade are simply anti-globalization. 6 An anti-globalization stance is viewed
24. Overview of the FTAA Process, at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/View-e.asp (last visited Feb.
3, 2003).
25. Sheryl Dickey, The Free Trade Area of the Americas and Human Rights Concerns, 8
HUM. RTs. BRIEFS 26, 26 (2001).
26. Global Exchange, Frequently Asked Questions About the Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA), at http://www.globalexchange.org/ftaa/faq.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2003).
27. Id.
28. Overview of the FTAA Process, supra note 24.
29. Robin Wright, Summit of the Americas: Activists in Quebec Show Evolution of an
Opposition, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2001, at A10.
30. Global Exchange, supra note 26.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Wright, supra note 29.
34. Grimm, supra note 13, at 181-82.
35. Id. at 197.
36. Wright, supra note 29.
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as impracticable and naive in a time where globalization is no longer seen as a policy
choice, but as a fact.37 However, the opponents of modem trade agreements, for the
most part, are not anti-globalization. 38 Instead, they oppose the path that current
globalization has taken.39 They protest the corporate control and the lack of
consideration for the human toll that modem trade agreements and globalization have
taken.40 They too see globalization as inevitable, and not an unwelcome occurrence. 4,
What they have been seeking is recognition that theform that globalization has taken is
not inevitable. Policy choices are contained within current trade agreements.43 Thus
far, the policy choice has been to exclude labor from the negotiating table.
There has been significant debate about the propriety of labor provisions within
trade agreements. Opponents of placing labor provisions within trade agreements have
offered a variety of reasons in support of their position. One argument is that benefits
to society's overall social welfare will automatically flow from the economic growth
spurred by free trade, and that consequently there is no need to make special provisions
for social concerns within the trade agreements themselves. 44 A second argument is
that labor provisions are a matter of domestic concern and any attempt to force nations
to adopt workers' rights provisions would infringe upon the sovereignty of negotiating
members.45 A third argument against the inclusion of labor provisions within trade
agreements is that international trade agreements are not the appropriate forum in
which to undertake social legislation.46 These arguments will be addressed in turn.
A. The Placement of Labor Provisions Within Trade Agreements
Many opponents of the inclusion of labor provisions within trade agreements have
argued that benefits to social welfare will automatically accrue from the economic
prosperity free trade is promised to bring. The theory is that as a nation's government
and businesses prosper from reduced trade barriers, this prosperity will "trickle down"
to the benefit of all of society.47 President George W. Bush signaled his belief in this
theory when he stated that "[f]ree and open trade creates new jobs and new income. It
lifts the lives of all our people, applying the power of markets to the needs of the
poor.,
48
37. Taylor, supra note 14, at 432.
38. Wright, supra note 29.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Taylor, supra note 14, at 432.
44. Dinah Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 273, 292 (2002); Bobbi-Lee Meloro, Comment, Balancing the Goals of Free Trade
with Workers' Rights in a Hemispheric Economy, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. 1. REV. 433, 444
(1998).
45. Meloro, supra note 44, at 444.
46. Id.
47. But see Cohn, supra note 9, at 428 (arguing that national prosperity does not, in fact,
"trickle down" to benefit all citizens).
48. Robin Wright, Bush Says Free Trade Is Key to Meeting Needs of Poor, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
22, 2001, at Al.
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There are a number of factors that chip away at the theory that prosperity for all will
necessarily follow from free trade. Most importantly, since the passage of NAFTA,
there has been an increased stratification between those with the most wealth and those
with the least. Since the enactment of NAFTA, the number of people living in poverty
in Mexico has increased and wages have decreased.49 In the United States, the wages
of lower-income workers have decreased, while corporate profits have soared.5° In
fact, President Bush acknowledged these trends when he commented that "[s]ome
complain that despite our democratic gains, there is still too much poverty, inequality.
Some even say that things are getting worse, not better. For too many, this may be
true."
51
The ability of liberalized trade to improve the conditions of all within a country is
dependent upon the way that the liberalized trade is structured. According to one
commentator, '."[tirade has the power to create opportunities and support livelihoods;
and it has the power to destroy them."52 According to this commentator, "[t]he human
impact of trade depends on how goods are produced, who controls the production and
marketing, how the wealth generated is distributed, and the terms upon which
countries trade. The way in which the international trading system is managed has a
critical bearing on all of these areas." 53 According to this view, benefits do not
automatically accrue upon the passage of agreements liberalizing trade; the agreements
must be structured in such a way so as to foster the improvements sought.
A second factor that works to contradict the theory that labor provisions are
unnecessary within trade agreements is the role played by the multinational corporation
("MNC"). MNCs are corporations that are headquartered in one country and that
operate factories and other business across national boundaries.54 Because MNCs are
international in nature, "they 'are uniquely situated to [benefit from] the liberalization
of free international trade.' ' 55 As businesses focused upon profits, MNCs have an
incentive to locate their factories where production costs are the lowest. 56 With the
lowered trade barriers resulting from trade agreements, MNCs are free to relocate to
the nation in which production costs are the lowest.57 The incentive for MNCs to
relocate has caused some to fear that nations will begin to compete with each other in
what has been termed a "race-to-the-bottom., 58 The theory is that with the ever present
threat that MNCs will relocate, nations will compete with each other to maintain
conditions most favorable to MNCs. 59 Countries will suppress minimum wages and
minimum worker safety standards to remain an inviting host to MNC business." Under
49. Cohn, supra note 9, at 428.
50. Id.
51. Wright, supra note 48.
52. KEVIN WATKINS, THE OXFAM POVERTY REPORT 109 (1995).
53. Id. at 109-10 (emphasis added).
54. Meloro, supra note 44, at 446.
55. Id. (quoting Karen V. Champion, Who Pays for Free Trade? The Dilemma of Free
Trade and International Labor Standards, 22 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 181, 192 (1996)).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id.; Shelton, supra note 44, at 295-96.
60. See Meloro, supra note 44, at 446; Shelton, supra note 44, at 295-96.
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this theory, while a country may benefit from the increased production upon its soil,
workers will not similarly enjoy that benefit. In fact, according to this theory, the
ability of the government and MNCs to profit depends upon the suppression of wages
and working conditions.
There has, in fact, been some evidence that the fear of the "race-to-the-bottom," as
it is argued would be allowed by liberalized trade, is not unfounded. Modem media is
filled with stories of scandal affiliated with the poor working conditions maintained by
American companies operating abroad.6'
B. Potential Impact upon National Sovereignty
A second argument against the inclusion of labor provisions within international
trade agreements is that labor provisions are a matter of domestic concern and any
attempt to force nations to adopt workers' rights provisions would infringe upon the
sovereignty of negotiating members. 62 This argument is unconvincing for a number of
reasons. First, the adoption of a trade agreement by any country is voluntary.63 No
party to any international agreement is forced to participate. 64 Second, and more
importantly, all trade agreements inherently require member nations to forego some
element of their sovereignty.65 Members to most trade agreements forfeit their
sovereign right to impose a number of trade barriers. 66 All countries choosing to enter
into international trade agreements forego some aspect of their sovereign ability to
make independent decisions. 67 Including labor provisions within these kinds of
agreements would impose no unique risk to national sovereignty.
C. Social Legislation or Trade Issue?
A third argument against the inclusion of labor provisions within trade agreements
is that international trade agreements are not the appropriate forum in which to
undertake social legislation. 68 The International Chamber of Commerce has stated that
"the trading system was not designed to address... non-trade issues .... [To] call on
it to do so would expose the trading system to great strain and the risk of increased
protectionism. . . .,,69 The crux of this debate revolves around whether labor issues
61. See, e.g., Alexander Cockburn, Commentary: Running From Reebok's Hypocrisy, L.A.
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2002, at B 17; Steven Greenhouse, Beatings and Other Abuses Cited at Samoan
Apparel Plant that Supplies U.S. Retailers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2001, at A14; Steven
Greenhouse, Labor Abuses in El Salvador Are Detailed in Document, N.Y. TIMES, May 10,
2001, at A12; Andrew Perrin, Critics Accuse Taiwan of Operating Sweathshops, S.F. CHRON.,
Aug. 15, 2001, at A6.
62. Meloro, supra note 44, at 450.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Taylor, supra note 14, at 412 (quoting Peter Capella, Business Backs Trade Role for UN,
GUARDIAN (London), July 6, 1999).
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constitute simply social legislation or whether they too constitute a trade issue.
Labor provisions and trade are interdependent.70 Labor impacts trade concerns.
"[W]here labor rights are enforced, wages and benefits tend to be higher."71 As labor
costs in a given country increase as compared to its trading partners, any competitive
advantage enjoyed by the country in its ability to attract foreign direct investment
decreases; with the labor provisions, it now costs more to house a business in that
country than in the competing trading countries. 72 Additionally, an increase in labor
costs reduces the competitive position of the products produced within the country
allowing labor rights; either products cost more to produce or the profit margin on the
product is reduced in comparison to products produced by countries with fewer or no
labor benefits.73
Conversely, trade impacts labor.74 While studies have disagreed upon the extent of
NAFTA's impact, many studies have acknowledged that the agreement has impacted
jobs in one way or another.75 In fact, a persuasion point initially used by those in favor
of NAFTA was that the agreement would create a significant number of jobs.76 In
contrast, those opposed to the agreement alleged that NAFTA would cause the United
States to lose jobs to Mexico.7 7 Either way, labor concerns comprised a significant
portion of the original NAFTA debate.
In sum, none of the reasons proffered by those who oppose labor provisions within
trade agreements are persuasive. Benefits to society's overall social welfare do not
automatically flow from the economic growth spurred by free trade; the benefits of free
trade do not necessarily trickle down. Labor provisions do not impact upon national
sovereignty any more than any other provisions contained within international trade
agreements. Finally, labor provisions cannot be rejected as simply social legislation
having no place within trade agreements. As has been discussed, labor impacts trade
and trade impacts labor; denying this interdependency ignores a fundamental reality.
The exclusion of labor from international trade agreements is a policy choice; it does
not constitute a foregone conclusion.
III. LABOR PROBLEMS UNIQUELY ENCOUNTERED BY WOMEN
Beyond the obstacles encountered by traditional labor organizations, women face
their own unique labor-oriented problems. While the success of labor organizations in
securing protections for laborers generally would benefit many women workers, certain
problems encountered by women specifically fall outside of the ambit of the concerns
most traditional labor organizations have undertaken. This Part will outline two
70. Meloro, supra note 44, at 451.
71. Robert F. Housman, The Treatment of Labor and Environmental Issues in Future
Western Hemisphere Trade Liberalization Efforts, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 301, 316 (1995).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 317.
75. Id.
76. Clinton Signs NAFTA, With a Promise to Labor, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 9, 1993, at 14. Clinton
"predicted that the trade agreement would result in a net gain of U.S. jobs, up to 200,000 new
ones by 1995." Id.
77. Id.
[Vol. 78:877
FTAA AND WORKING WOMEN
particular obstacles that women have faced in getting their particular needs met
through trade agreements and labor organizations generally. This Part will first outline
the double impact of the public/private divide on women. This public/private divide
has internationally defined labor protections as being solely within the ambit of
domestic concern and thus not a concern for international trade agreements. This
divide has hindered women's ability to obtain serious consideration of their needs
within the international arena. This differentiation has also hindered women's ability to
get their concerns addressed within the domestic sphere; many labor obstacles faced by
women, such as childcare and sexual harassment, have been viewed as private
concerns-things to be dealt with within the family. Consequently, even within the
domestic realm women's labor needs have gone unmet. This Part will also outline
some of the obstacles that women have faced in obtaining consideration of their
specific needs within labor organizations, both domestically and internationally.
Prior to delving into a discussion of unique labor concerns faced by women, a
caveat must be set out. The concerns faced by women are diverse. It would be
impossible to make an accurate sweeping statement regarding women's labor needs
within in the United States itself; it would be even more absurd to pretend that all
women within the Western Hemisphere have identical labor needs. However, there
are many similarities in the conditions that women face universally, whether by virtue
of biology or by virtue of social construct. It is these similarities that this Note attempts
to address.
A. The "Public/Private Divide"
The main obstacle that women have encountered in obtaining consideration of their
specific labor needs within international trade agreements has been a result of what has
been termed the "public/private divide., 79 The problems associated with the
"public/private divide" are manifested in two primary forms. 8° The first form this
divide takes is that the international realm and the domestic realm are viewed as two
separate and distinct areas of law. 81 That which occurs in the international realm is
considered public, meaning open for discussion and debate among countries, 82 while
that which occurs within the domestic realm is considered private, meaning not an
appropriate area for international action. 83 This distinction presents a problem similar
to that faced by labor organizations generally; labor and gender issues are viewed as
84matters of domestic concern. Many involved with international trade view trade
agreements as an inappropriate forum within which to address what they term domestic
78. Doris Elisabeth Buss, Going Global: Feminist Theory, International Law, and the
Public/Private Divide, in CHALLENGING THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 360, 360-61 (Susan B. Boyd ed., 1997); CYNTHIA ENLOE, BANANAS, BEACHES,
AND BASES: MAKING FEMINIST SENSE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 175-76 (updated ed., 2000).
79. Buss, supra note 78, at 364-73.
80. Id. at 364-65.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See supra text accompanying notes 68-77.
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social legislation.85 Thus, it has been difficult for both women's and labor
organizations to garner a hearing for their concerns within an international trade
environment. However, as was discussed above, the rationales for considering labor
concerns as matters of social legislation unrelated to trade are unconvincing.
86
Second, the "public/private divide" has taken root in the lives of individuals.
Countries across the globe have drawn a distinction between the public world-which
includes business, politics, economics, and the law-and the private world, consisting
of home and family.87 Historically, men's work has been defined as that which occurs
within the public sphere (e.g., business, politics, economics, and the law) and women's
work has been defined as that which occurs within the private sphere (e.g., home and
family). 88 While these distinctions are slowly being dismantled, relics of their existence
continue to plague women's ability to influence international trade.
Women have historically been excluded from international law, and they continue
to remain on its margins. 89 International law has been viewed as a public sphere in
which only men were capable of participating. 90 Men have constructed international
law and defined its parameters. 91 Consequently, as women have begun to act within the
international sphere, they have been forced to challenge the parameters as they have
been defined.92
Additionally, this "public/private divide" has had implications for how the labor
marketplace itself has been defined.93 Where international agreements have
acknowledged labor as deserving of protection, only labor taking place within the
"public sphere" has been acknowledged as meriting recognition and, to an extent,
regulation.94 Work performed within the home has been termed "private" and, thus,
neither recognized nor regulated.95 Much of the work that women perform falls within
this private sphere, either because it consists of unpaid chores performed within the
home, or because it constitutes paid labor performed within the home. 96 Because
women make up the majority of those who perform this private sphere work, there
exists an extremely inadequate picture of women's economic contributions throughout
the World. 97
The implications of this omission are large for women as a whole. Despite women's
increased participation within the public sphere over the course of the past few
85. Meloro, supra note 44, at 450-51.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 71-76.
87. Susan B. Boyd, Challenging the Public/Private Divide: An Overview, in CHALLENGING
THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE: FEMINISM, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3, 8-10 (Susan B. Boyd ed.,
1997).
88. Id.
89. See ENLOE, supra note 78, at 7-11.
90. Id. at 4.
91. Id.
92. See id.
93. Boyd, supra note 87, at 9.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Kathryn B. Ward & Jean Larson Pyle, Gender, Industrialization, Transnational
Corporations, and Development: An Overview of Trends and Patterns, in WOMEN INTHELATIN
AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 37, 46 (Christine E. Bose & Edna Acosta-Belrn eds., 1995).
97. Id.
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decades, women remain responsible for the majority of the work performed within the
private sphere.98 Refusing to recognize labor performed within the home as a valuable
international commodity fails to assign value to a significant portion of work for which
women are responsible. Women's unpaid work within the private sphere frees capital
to be used in other ways within national and international economies. 99 "As producers
and consumers, women [working within the home] provide food, clothing, and energy
and maintain the family in time-consuming activities."' 1°°
Further, the "public/private divide" has provided a rationale for failing to regulate
or even recognize paid informal work that is performed within the home or private
sphere. This "informal" work encompasses "subcontracted industrial and service work,
retail activities (street vendors), domestic service, the sex trade, and agricultural
work. °101 Women's participation within the paid informal sphere is higher
internationally than their participation within the formal sphere. 0 2 In 1980, women
made up three-quarters of the informal laborers in Chile, Brazil, and Costa Rica.
10 3
Within this informal sector, women's wages are only 45 to 74% of men's earnings.l°4
Women often supplement their incomes earned in the formal sector through
employment within the informal sector. 05 Women holding these positions report a high
level of dissatisfaction with their informal employment because of "low wages, little
control over the work processes, health risks, long hours, and overhead costs.' 06
Despite women's significant participation within these private or informal sectors,
international trade agreements continue to exclude these sectors from their labor
protections, if they provide any protections at all.
B. Underrepresentation Within Labor Organizations
Women have traditionally been underrepresented within union and other labor
organizations. 10 7 This circumstance has served as an additional barrier hindering
women's ability to obtain recognition for their specific labor needs within international
agreements. Additionally, women's concerns have not always received a high priority
on the agenda of labor organizations.' °8 Male laborers are not always supportive of
women's demands. 0 9 Some male laborers have viewed women's calls for protection
from sexual harassment and for maternity leave as "irrelevant to 'serious' trade union
activity."''
0
98. Id. at 47.
99. Grimm, supra note 13, at 193.
100. Ward & Pyle, supra note 96, at 50-51.
101. Id. at 47.
102. Id. at 48.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 47.
106. Id. at 50.
107. See Erika Gottfried, Note, MERCOSUR: A Tool to Further Women's Rights in the
Member Nations, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 923, 927 (1998).
108. ENLOE, supra note 78, at 166.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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Further, women have not always been receptive to participation within unions.' 11 As
the members of households generally responsible for the work within the home, women
who are employed outside the home may not have extra time to participate in union
activity. 112 This double shift of work prevents women from engaging in union activity.
Additionally, many women, especially those who serve as the primary wage earners
within their home, do not want to upset their employers by participating in union
activity. 113 Finally, it is possible that because of the lack of receptivity to women's
concerns discussed above," 14 women have not felt comfortable participating in
traditional labor organizations.
This Part has outlined the ways in which the public/private divide and the
underrepresentation within domestic and international labor organizations have
impacted the ability of women to influence international trade agreements. The
following Part demonstrates the repercussions that result from excluding the voice of
women's labor from international trade negotiations.
IV. NAFTA & NAALC
As the first international trade agreement in which the United States agreed to
include certain provisions for labor protections, NAFTA and its side agreement,
NAALC, were significant achievements for labor organizations within the member
countries.' 15 As was discussed in the preceding Part, however, the voice of women's
labor has struggled to find a hearing within the international trade community.
Consequently, the labor provisions contained within NAFTA and NAALC did not
sufficiently address many of the needs faced specifically by women laborers.
This Part will first provide an overview of the conditions under which the member
countries passed both NAFTA and its side agreement, NAALC. This Part will then
outline the substantive and procedural provisions contained within NAFTA and
NAALC. Finally, this Part will address the ways in which NAFTA and NAALC failed
to adequately offer protection for many of women's specific labor needs.
A. Background
The passage of NAFTA was a monumental achievement, not only because it created
the World's largest continental free trade zone, but also because it was the first
international trade agreement in which the United States included labor provisions."1
6
Initially, however, the administration of the senior President George Bush argued that
NAFTA did not need labor provisions." 7 In 1991, as NAFTA negotiations were
occurring, then President Bush asserted that Mexico had labor standards comparable to
I 11. Grimm, supra note 13, at 207-08.
112. Id. (specifically addressing the situation of Mexican women).
113. Id. at 208.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 108-10.
115. Grimm, supra note 13, at 180-81.
116. Id.
117. Joel Solomon, Trading Away Rights: The Unfulfilled Promise of NAFTA 's Labor Side
Agreement, 13 HuM. RTs. WATCH 2(B), Apr. 2001, at 1, 14, available at http://www.hrw.org/
reports/2001/nafta/naftaO4Ol-04.htm#P405_58779 (last visited Feb. 3, 2003).
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those of the United States and Canada. 18 President Bush contended that what was
lacking in Mexico were the budgetary resources necessary to allow the efficient
enforcement of the labor standards that Mexico did have. 119 The Bush Administration
maintained that NAFTA itself would generate the economic resources that Mexico
would need in order to effectively enforce its labor laws.' 2
0
Labor organizations within the United States were not as optimistic as the Bush
Administration. They were concerned that slack labor standards would both harm
Mexican workers and, with the open borders created by NAFTA, cause American
businesses to relocate to Mexico where labor costs would be cheaper.' 2' NAFrA
became a political issue when the 1992 presidential election coincided with the
NAFTA negotiations. 122 With labor organizations as a core Democratic constituency,
Bill Clinton, the Democratic presidential candidate, promised to support NAFTA as
long as it contained side agreements on labor rights and the environment. 123
President Clinton began negotiations with Canada and Mexico for a labor side
agreement soon after taking office.' 24 Labor organizations remained skeptical about
whether a side agreement would be enough to sufficiently protect labor needs, and, in
an effort to garner the support needed to ensure NAFTA's passage in Congress,
President Clinton solicited assistance from business leaders.' 25 Business leaders
refused to make any type of pledge promising not to relocate their businesses to
Mexico, where labor standards were more lax, if NAFrA were passed. 126 Instead, a
group of 2700 companies undertook a massive public relations campaign in an attempt
to assure the public that NAFTA would not benefit special interests at the expense of
America's workers.' 
27
The campaign undertaken by business leaders proved successful and the United
128States Congress ratified NAFTA in 1993. NAFTA became operative on January 1,
1994. 129 The side agreement regarding labor, NAALC, also became effective on
January 1, 1994.130
B. NAALC Substance and Procedure
The United States, Mexico, and Canada were unified in their opposition against any
labor side agreement that would hinder their "sovereign right to control [their]
individual domestic labor laws."' 3' Consequently, the language contained within
118. Id. (quoting President George Herbert Walker Bush).
119. Id. (quoting President George Herbert Walker Bush).
120. Id.
121. Taylor, supra note 14, at 407.
122. Solomon, supra note 117, at 14-15.
123. Id. at 14.
124. Id. at 15.
125. Taylor, supra note 14, at 406.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 406-07.
128. Grimm, supra note 13, at 180 n.1.
129. Id. at 180.
130. Id. at 180 n.3.
131. Taylor, supra note 14, at 415.
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NAALC is purposely vague.' 32 NAALC did not establish uniform labor standards
among the three member countries. 133 Nor did it require the strengthening of any of the
countries' current labor standards.' 34 Instead, it merely required that each country
enforce the labor laws that it already had in place. 135 Assuring each member country of
its sovereign right to create and maintain its own labor laws, Article 2 of NAALC
states,
[a]ffirming full respect for each Party's constitution, and recognizing the right of
each Party to establish its own domestic labor standards, and to adopt or modify
accordingly its labor laws and regulations, each Party shall ensure that its labor
laws and regulations provide for high labor standards, consistent with high quality
and productive workplaces, and shall continue to strive to improve those standards
in that light. 36
In an effort to accomplish this goal, NAALC set out eleven labor rights norms,
which it divided into a hierarchy of three tiers. '37 The actions allowed for enforcement
under NAALC depend upon the tier in which a given norm falls.' 38 The first tier
requires labor protections for children, minimum employment standards, including
minimum wage, and the prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses. 139 The
second tier requires a prohibition of forced labor, compensation in cases of
occupational injuries and illnesses, protection of migrant labor, elimination of
employment discrimination, and equal pay for men and women. 140 The third tier
requires freedom of association, the right to bargain collectively, and the right to
strike. 141
If one member country believes that another is not fulfilling its commitment as laid
out within NAALC, the recourse available is dependent upon the tier in which the
allegedly violated norm falls. 142 Each country maintains what is called a National
Administrative Office ("NAO"). 143 Complaints to be considered by the NAO can either
be presented by interested nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") or the complaint
may be instigated by the NAO itself.' 44 All allegations of NAALC violations are
brought to the NAQ of the country in which the complainant resides. 14' The NAO
maintains discretion to determine if the complaint merits review. 146 If the complaint
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Solomon, supra note 117, at 15.
136. NAALC, supra note 7, art. 2, 32 I.L.M. at 1503.
137. Solomon, supra note 117, at vii (explaining the NAALC's division of labor rights
norms into three tiers); see also NAALC, supra note 7, Annex 1, 32 I.L.M. at 1515.
138. Solomon, supra note 117, at viii.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Taylor, supra note 14, at 417.
144. Grimm, supra note 13, at 195.
145. Taylor, supra note 14, at 417.
146. Id.
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merits review, the NAO begins consultations with the accused NAALC member.
147
These consultations take the form of government to government talks, and the parties
can agree to a plan that will address the nonenforcement complaint. 148 The NAO
complaint procedure can result only in cooperation among the NAALC member
nations and a recommendation by the NAO and its government regarding avenues
through which to remedy the violation. 149 Any agreement reached between the parties
at this level of the NAALC complaint process is not binding.150 For the labor norms
contained within the third tier, this procedure constitutes the extent of the complaint
process.151 Consequently, if any NAALC member government prohibits or hinders
freedom of association, the right to organize, the right to bargain collectively, or the
right to strike, the sole recourse under NAALC is to request that the NAO of the
complainant's home country undertake consultations with the violating country.
For alleged violations of a right contained in NAALC's first or second tier, if the
consultations between the NAO and the violating country are not successful, then the
complaining party can request the creation of an Evaluation Committee of Experts
("ECE").152 Upon review, if the ECE finds that a violation of NAALC's first or second
tier norms has occurred, the sole remedy obtainable from the ECE is the issuance of
"non-adversarial and non-binding recommendations on the issue." 53 For the labor
norms contained within the second tier, this procedure constitutes the extent of the
complaint process.154 Consequently, if any NAALC member government violates the
prohibition against forced labor, fails to compensate victims in cases of occupational
injuries and illnesses, fails to protect migrant labor, fails to eliminate employment
discrimination, or fails to assure equal pay for men and women, the sole recourse
under NAALC is the issuance by an ECE of a nonadversarial and nonbinding
recommendation on the issue.
If the complaint concerns a norm contained within the first tier and the ECE fails to
produce results, then the matter can be submitted to the Council of Ministers for
mediation.155 If the Council of Ministers is unsuccessful in mediating a resolution to
the matter, then the complaint can be submitted to an arbitration panel.' 56 If the
arbitration panel finds that a NAALC member nation has violated one of the norms
contained within the first tier of rights, then the arbitration panel may recommend an
action plan that may include sanctions. 57 However, the arbitration panel would take
such a drastic action only if the panel found a "persistent pattern of failure" to enforce
the first tier labor norms.'
5 8
147. Id.
148. Solomon, supra note 117, at viii.
149. Grimm, supra note 13, at 194.
150. Taylor, supra note 14, at 417.
151. Id.
152. Taylor, supra note 14, at 417.
153. Id. (quoting Joel Solomon, Mexico, Labor Rights and NAFTA, 8 HuM. RTs.
WATCH/AMs 2 (1996)).
154. Id.
155. Grimm, supra note 13, at 196.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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In sum, throughout the NAALC process, only the final arbitration panel has the
right to impose sanctions upon a violating government and the panel would do so only
if the violating member were found to have violated a first tier norm consistently.
Consequently, sanctions may be assigned to a violating country under NAALC, only if
the country is found to have consistently failed to provide labor protections for
children; consistently failed to implement minimum employment standards, such as a
minimum wage; or consistently failed to enact and enforce laws that would prevent
occupational injuries and illnesses.
C. NAFTA & NAALC: Repercussions for Women
NAALC constitutes a victory of sorts for labor organizations and women within the
international trade agreement sphere because, as has been noted, NAALC is the first
international trade agreement in which the United States has agreed to include labor
protections. 159 Despite their inclusion, however, the NAALC labor provisions are far
from encompassing all that is required to ensure that women's labor needs are
protected.
There are a number of areas in which NAFTA and NAALC could serve to more
fully protect the needs of women laborers. Importantly, NAALC does not establish
uniform standards among the three member nations.'60 The strength of the NAALC
provisions depends upon the strength of the laws within the individual member nations.
Therefore, the protections afforded by NAALC are worthless if the member nation
does not maintain laws that effectively protect against an enumerated NAALC
concern.'16 For example, Mexican law clearly forbids pregnancy discrimination against
current employees, but it is not clear whether Mexican law prohibits pregnancy
discrimination in hiring decisions. 162 While NAALC prohibits employment
discrimination, it does not define employment discrimination.163 Defining employment
discrimination is left to the individual member nations. Consequently, because it is
unclear whether Mexican law prohibits discrimination against pregnant women in
hiring decisions, Mexican women may not be protected against this form of
discrimination.
Further, there is no independent oversight body responsible for enforcing the
NAALC provisions. 64 When allegations of NAALC violations are presented, the
individual NAOs have complete discretion to decide which complaints have merit and
how meritorious cases should be handled. 65 Predictably, considerations relevant to
bilateral relations between countries are likely to impact any decision to take action. 66
Prior to instigating a claim, NAOs and their governments are likely to consider the
impact of such a decision upon policies regarding not only trade itself, but also
159. Id. at 181.
160. Id. at 198.
161. Id. at 220-21.
162. Id.
163. See NAALC, supra note 7, Annex 1, 32 I.L.M. at 1515.
164. Solomon, supra note 117, at 2.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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potential implications for immigration and narcotics policies. 167 If the NAO determines
that a claim is not worth pursuing, NAALC provides individuals with no further
recourse for vindicating their rights.168 Significantly, while complaints to be considered
by the individual NAOs may be brought by NGOs or instigated by the NAOs
themselves, no NAO has chosen to undertake an investigation of a fellow member
nation upon its own initiative. 1
69
Additionally, while NAALC sets out eleven recognized workers' rights upon which
the member countries must focus their concern, the agreement allows sanctions for the
violation of only three of the included rights. 170 Negotiations among the member
countries constitute the only available recourse for a violation of any of the other eight
rights.171 This establishment of a hierarchy of rights creates the appearance that certain
rights are arbitrarily more important than others-the failure by member nations to
establish minimum employment standards, such as minimum wages, is sanctionable,
while the failure to prevent forced labor merits only consultations among member
governments.' 
72
While NAALC calls for the elimination of employment discrimination and equal
pay for men and women, it places these rights within the second tier of labor rights,
meaning that the greatest remedy available as a consequence of a violation of these
rights is an intergovernmental consultation. 73 Sanctions are not available for a
violation of these rights.' 74 The refusal of the governments to allow sanctions for a
failure to consistently prevent employment discrimination or a consistent failure to
guarantee equal pay among the sexes indicates a view among member nations that the
prevention of gender discrimination is not a top priority.I17
Furthermore, neither NAFTA nor NAALC recognizes work within the "domestic
sphere as a commodity that contributes to international trade."' 76 As discussed above,
work performed within the domestic sphere is of vital importance internationally;
women's unpaid work within the private sphere frees capital to be used in other ways
within national and international economies. 177 Refusing to recognize labor performed
within the home as a valuable international commodity fails to assign value to a
significant portion of work for which women are responsible. 78 The failure to
recognize the labor that occurs within the domestic sphere constitutes a policy choice
reflecting the belief that domestic or private sphere labor does not merit official
recognition.
79
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169. Grimm, supra note 13, at 211-12.
170. Solomon, supra note 117, at viii.
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Additionally, only the member governments are bound by NAALC. 8 ° The
agreement does not apply to private entities such as corporations.' 81 Hence, under
NAALC, individual corporations are free to violate labor rights; it remains up to the
member governments to ensure that compliance with NAALC occurs. 18 That an
international trade agreement binds only member governments, not private entities, is
not unusual. However, what is unique about NAFTA and NAALC is that while they
require nothing from private corporations, NAFTA entitles corporations to directly
bring binding arbitration proceedings against NAFTA member governments when the
private corporations' rights under NAFTA have been violated.' 83 But individuals are
not entitled to bring these binding arbitration proceedings against governments directly
under NAALC.184 In fact, NAALC does not provide specific guarantees for any
individual laborer.' 85 NAALC applies only if it is demonstrated that a member nation
has repeatedly violated a norm contained within the agreement. 186
Finally, NAALC fails to secure rights that most women consider essential to their
ability to work outside the home. 187 NAALC does not guarantee parental leave in cases
of a child's sickness or a child's birth. 188 NAALC does not provide a right to
affordable childcare. | 89 NAALC fails to make any assurance of either fair
representation or fair treatment of women within labor unions. 190 Further, NAALC
does not explicitly prohibit sexual harassment in the workplace. 191
This Part demonstrates that while the inclusion of labor provisions within an
international trade agreement constitutes a significant achievement for laborers,
NAFTA and NAALC have not ultimately granted laborers, and women laborers in
particular, the tools with which to adequately protect themselves from labor abuses and
to obtain fair treatment. Understanding the inadequacies of NAFTA and NAALC will
enable women's groups and labor groups to advocate for changes to future trade
agreements that will offer them the protection needed for adequate and equal working
conditions. The following Part will suggest ways in which future trade agreements, and
the FTAA in particular, can account for women's specific labor needs to ensure that
women have access to equal working conditions in this increasingly interconnected and
globalized world.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FTAA
As discussed above, all countries of the Western Hemisphere (except Cuba) are
180. Id. at 194.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Lawrence L. Herman, Settlement of International Trade Disputes-Challenges to
Sovereignty-A Canadian Perspective, 24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 121, 123 (1998).
184. Solomon, supra note 117, at 2.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Grimm, supra note 13, at 197.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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currently negotiating the FTAA. Labor and human rights groups have become vocal
opponents of the FTAA. 192 These groups believe that the FTAA will "empower
corporations to constrain governments [sic] ability to set standards for public health
and safety, to safeguard the rights of their workers, and to ensure that corporations do
not pollute the communities in which they operate."' 193 In essence, the FTAA grants
corporations the ability to move their operations more freely within the negotiated
trade area and allows them to sue the host government when any right granted within
the trade agreement has been violated. Opponents of the FTAA fear that the agreement
would provide corporations with the increased ability to impact the lives of member
nations' laborers without offering the laborers any form of protection. As has been
demonstrated, the terms negotiated within the trade agreements have a significant
impact upon laborers within the member countries. Yet, despite these realities, labor
representatives have been excluded from the FTAA negotiations.
94
The proposed FTAA represents an exciting opportunity to rectify the problems
contained within NAFTA. It stands as an opportunity to incorporate standards that will
truly work to benefit the lives of working women. Women's organizations and labor
organizations must make known to the international community that their inclusion at
the negotiating table is critical to the successful implementation of international trade
agreements. These groups must demonstrate that their exclusion from negotiations to
date has been a policy choice, not a necessity. If women's groups and labor groups are
allowed access to trade negotiations, the FTAA could likely be a useful tool for
improvement in the lives of working women.
Women's and labor organizations must be allowed access to the FTAA negotiating
table. Women have been denied this access in the past. 195 A variety of corporate
committees have been established and are allowed to provide direction to the
agreement negotiators. 196 While a "Committee of Government Representatives on Civil
Society" has been established to represent the views of "civil society,"'197 labor
organizations and women's groups should be allowed their own independent
committee. Including labor needs within the heading of "civil society" fails to
recognize the intricate role that labor plays within trade. Trade and labor are
interdependent; labor concerns must be addressed in any effort to create a well-
balanced international trade agreement.
In contrast to NAFTA and NAALC, provisions for labor should be placed within
the main text of the FTAA. Including labor provisions within the main text would serve
as a confirmation that labor provisions are to be taken seriously. Fair labor practices
would be as important within the agreement as fair trade practices. No longer would it
be technically compliant with major trade agreements to violate labor rights in an effort
to gain a trade advantage.
Under the FTAA, individuals should be granted rights similar to those granted to
private corporations; individuals should be permitted to sue governments directly.
Under NAFTA, corporations are permitted to sue governments directly when
192. Wright, supra note 29.
193. Global Exchange, supra note 26.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
2003]
INDIA NA LAW JOURNAL
governments violate a NAFTA provision in a way that causes harm to the
corporation. 198 Similarly, individuals deprived of the labor rights spelled out within the
FTAA should also be permitted to sue member governments directly. Bypassing the
NAO complaint procedure and allowing individual persons to sue violating
governments-governments refusing to enact or enforce the required protective
provisions-would ensure that FTAA labor violations are taken seriously.
The FTAA should set uniform standards for workers rights among member nations,
in addition to the protections afforded by each country's domestic laws. However, the
needs of laborers among all member nations would not be identical and this reality
would need to be reflected as the provisions are drafted. Further, unlike the undefined
labor norms contained within NAALC, the uniform standards should provide concrete
definitions for their terms. This clarification would avoid the definitional problems that
have occurred under NAALC, such as questions as to whether a prohibition against
employment discrimination means only discrimination against current employees, or
whether discrimination is prohibited in hiring decisions as well.
Included within these uniform labor standards should be provisions intended to
protect the rights that most women consider essential to their ability to work outside
the home. These include parental leave for both parents in cases of a child's sickness
or a child's birth, access to affordable childcare, and an assurance of either fair
representation or fair treatment of women within labor unions. Further, the FTAA must
explicitly prohibit sexual harassment in the workplace.
Finally, an alteration in the traditional definition of labor itself must occur. It would
be supremely idealistic to envision an international trade agreement in which work
performed within the home were valued equally with that of labor performed in the
public sector. However, the FTAA should at a minimum recognize and protect paid
labor performed within the private sphere, such as "subcontracted industrial and
service work, retail activities (street vendors), domestic service, the sex trade, and
agricultural work."199 Women's participation within the paid informal sphere is higher
internationally than their participation within the formal sphere.20 Women holding
these positions report a high level of dissatisfaction with their informal employment
because of "low wages, little control over the work processes, health risks, long hours,
and overhead costs."20' Recognition and regulation of this aspect of international labor
would translate into a significant benefit in women's lives.
CONCLUSION
The FTAA presents a unique opportunity to account for and to rectify NAFTA's
failures. While NAFTA was historic in that it was the first international trade
agreement in which the United States participated that included provisions for labor, it
has not been fully effective in securing labor rights within the member nations. Many
of women's unique labor needs were ignored altogether. Recognizing where the
NAFTA agreement failed women laborers will allow women to more effectively lobby
to address their concerns with the FTAA. By incorporating the above
198. Herman, supra note 183, at 123.
199. Ward & Pyle, supra note 96, at 47.
200. Id. at 48.
201. Id. at 50.
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recommendations, the FTAA could serve as an effective tool in protecting the labor
needs of women.

